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The primary objective of our study is to look into possible catalytic roles that CMIM, a 
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(AMRO) can play in enhancing macroeconomic policy cooperation in this region.  The key 
questions that the study hopes to address are: can CMIM and AMRO provide impetuses for 
deeper and more meaningful macroeconomic policy cooperation in the region? What are the 
policy areas and what could be the catalytic roles for CMIM and AMRO in promoting policy 
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1. Background and Motivation 
Amid the outbreak of sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone economies and general 
uncertainties with the global economy, regional financial arrangement has gained attention 
and consideration as a supplementary to available global cooperation and as a possible first 
line of defence against economic and financial shocks for the member states. This is 
particularly evident with the regional financial cooperation among the ASEAN+3 economies.i 
The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) and its macroeconomic surveillance unit, 
the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), established in March 2010 and 
May 2011, respectively, have made substantial headways. In the G-20 Meeting of Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors in April 2013 in Washington D.C. and in September 
2013 in Saint Petersburg, Russia, the ministers and governors reaffirm the important role 
that regional financial arrangements can play in the global financial safety nets.  
Nonetheless, a series of fundamental questions have also been raised along with the 
advancements of the regional cooperation among these Southeast and East Asian 
economies. Some of these issues have well been discussed by early studies such as 
Siregar and Chabchitrchaidol (2013), Hill and Menon (2012), Sussangkarn (2011) and 
Takagi (2010). The most common concern expressed by these studies surrounds the size of 
the CMIM facility itself. Despite the doubling of the CMIM funding to USD 240 billion, 
effective in May 2012, the amount has frequently been criticized as too small and 
insufficient. The European (EFSF) of 750 billion euro in 2011, for instance, amounted to 
about 8 percent of the total GDP of the group, while the CMIM facility amounted to only 
about 1.5 percent of the total GDP of the ASEAN+3 economies. Critics have also questioned 
the links and the coordination between bilateral and multilateral regional financial 
cooperation in the region. As will be elaborated further, bilateral swap arrangements 
between major economies (such as China and Japan) and other economies around the 
globe, including members of ASEAN (such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand), have intensified since 2008.  
While those concerns remain, the primary objective of our study is to look into 
possible catalytic roles that CMIM and AMRO can play in enhancing macroeconomic policy 
cooperation in this region.  As the title of the paper indicates, can CMIM and AMRO provide 
impetuses for deeper and more meaningful macroeconomic policy cooperation in the 
region? What are the policy areas and what could be the catalytic roles for CMIM and AMRO 
in promoting policy cooperation?  Equally important, what could be the potential 
impediments? 
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The roadmap of the paper is as follows. Section two will briefly discuss the rising 
degree of integration of ASEAN+3 globally and regionally. The main objectives of this 
section are to highlight the openness of the ASEAN+3 economies and more importantly the 
deepening of economic integration among these countries. Section three presents brief 
history on CMIM and AMRO, and highlights recent commitments. Next section attempts to 
address the key questions posted earlier. The discussion lists key policy areas for 
cooperation and presents basic premises and promises of the CMIM and AMRO in 
enhancing further policy coordination among the member economies. The discussion will 
then move on to underscore the urgency to establish a much needed arrangement to bring 
together regional bilateral and multilateral swap facilities into consistent, credible and 
mutually supportive financial liquidity supports. Section five ends the paper with brief 
concluding remarks.     
 
2. Brief Overview of Increasing Integration in ASEAN+3 Region 
2.1 Trade and Investment 
The regional economy of ASEAN+3 has seen steady deepening of economic 
integration in many fronts, including trades and formation of global supply chains. Total 
international trades among ASEAN+3 countries have more than tripled since 2000, and 
more importantly, that expansions in cross-border trades have been reported widely across 
the region. The ASEAN’s export to and import from Plus 3 have grown from USD 112 billion  
and USD 118 billion in 2000 to USD 405 billion and USD 442 billion in 2012, respectively 
(Figure 1). At the same time, trades within ASEAN and Plus 3 have also increased from 
USD 98 billion to 324 billion and from USD 206 billion to 718 billion, respectively, during the 
same period. Although exports to the US and the EU from ASEAN have also climbed, the 
rate of the increase was much less than that of intra-regional trades in ASEAN+3.  
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the Asian economies (ASEAN, Japan, Korea, China and India) made up close to 40 percent 
of total FDI to the ASEAN region in 2010. Owing to the low capital cost and outward 
investment policy initiative in China, SOEs and private firms are increasing their investments 
to establish off-shore operations. China’s outward investments to each of ASEAN countries 
have notably multiplied in recent years, excluding indirect flows via Hong Kong and other 
transitory destinations with low tax rates (Table 3). 
 
Table 2: Top Five Sources of Foreign Direct Investment Inflow to ASEAN 
 Value Share to Total Inflow 
 2008 2009 2010/p 2008 2009 2010/p 
European 
Union 
7010.1 9112.9 16984.1 14.9 22.4 20.6 
ASEAN 9449.3 5222.5 12107.5 20.1 13.8 16.0 
USA 3517.5 4086.7 8578.1 7.5 10.8 11.3 
Japan 4129.4 3762.6 8386.1 8.8 9.9 11.1 
Korea 1595.7 1471.5 3769.4 3.4 3.9 5.0 
Source: The ASEAN Secretariat; p/ preliminary number. 
Table 3: Stock of China’s outward foreign direct investments 
 2006 2010 Number of 
times 
increase 
USD mil % share of 
total Asia 
USD mil % share of 
total Asia 
Total Asia* 45,208 60.3 229,499 67.8 4.8 
Hong Kong 42,270 56.3 199,056 62.8 4.7 
Singapore 468 0.6 6,069 1.9 13.0 
Myanmar 163 0.2 1,947 0.6 11.9 
Indonesia 226 0.3 1,150 0.4 5.1 
Cambodia 104 0.1 1,130 0.4 10.9 
Japan 224 0.3 1,106 0.3 4.9 
Thailand 233 0.3 1,080 0.3 4.6 
Vietnam 254 0.3 987 0.3 3.9 
Laos 96 0.1 846 0.3 8.8 
Malaysia 197 0.3 709 0.2 3.6 
Korea 949 1.3 637 0.2 0.7 
Philippines 22 0.0 387 0.1 17.6 
Brunei 2 0.0 46 0.0 24.0 
* Asia refers to Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Korea & ASEAN 
 The large increase is due to a low base in 2006 
Source: Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China 
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Bank Corporation (OCBC) have achieved similar success in their efforts to become regional 
banks. 
 
Table 4: Cross Border Regional Banks in ASEAN and Other Asian Economies 
	
Country Top 3 domestic FIs in your 
jurisdiction that have 
significant presence in the 
region 
Top 3 foreign FIs in your 
jurisdiction that are 
originated from SEACEN 
member economies 
Top 3 other foreign FIs 
(apart from originating 
from SEACEN member 
economies) that have 
significant presence in 
your country 
 
Brunei Darussalam The domestic banks have a 
presence only within the 
country 
- Maybank 
(Malaysia) 
- UOB (Singapore) 
- RHB Bank Berhad 
(Malaysia) 
- Citibank 
- HSBC 
- Standard 
Chartered Bank 
 
Indonesia - Bank Mandiri 
- Bank BRI 
- BCA 
- CIMB Niaga 
(Malaysia) 
- Bank International 
Indonesia 
(MayBank 
Malaysia controls 
around 43%) 
- Citibank 
- HSBC 
- Standard 
Chartered Bank 
Korea - None - DBS (Singapore) 
- UOB (Singapore) 
- OCBC (Singapore) 
 
- Citibank 
- HSBC 
- Standard 
Chartered Bank 
 Malaysia - Maybank 
- CIMB Group 
- Public Bank 
- OCBC (Singapore) 
- UOB (Singapore) 
- Bangkok Bank 
(Thailand) 
- Citibank 
- HSBC 
- Standard 
Chartered Bank 
Papua New Guinea - Bank South Pacific  - Maybank 
(Malaysia) 
- ANZ Bank 
(Australia) 
- Westpac Bank 
(Australia) 
The Philippines - Metropolitan Bank 
Corporation 
(Metrobank) 
- Philippine National 
Bank (PNB) 
- Chinatrust 
(Taiwan) 
- Maybank 
(Malaysia) 
- Korea Exchange 
Bank (Korea) 
- Citibank 
- HSBC 
- Standard 
Chartered Bank 
Singapore 
 
 
- DBS Bank Limited 
- OCBC 
- UOB 
- Maybank 
(Malaysia) 
- Bangkok Bank 
(Thailand) 
- RHB Bank 
(Malaysia) 
- Citibank 
- HSBC 
- Standard 
Chartered Bank 
 
 Chinese Taipei - Bank of Taiwan 
- Taiwan 
Cooperative Bank 
- Mega International 
Commercial Bank 
- DBS (Singapore) 
- OCBC (Singapore) 
- Bangkok Bank 
(Thailand) 
- Citibank 
- HSBC 
- Standard and 
Chartered Bank 
Thailand 
 
- Bangkok Bank 
- Kasikorn Bank 
- Siam Commercial 
Bank 
- UOB (Singapore) 
- CIMB Thai 
(Malaysia) 
- OCBC (Singapore) 
- Citibank 
- HSBC 
- Standard 
Chartered 
Source:	Siregar	and	Lim	(2010)	
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How do the regionalization and globalization of the banking industry push for further 
integration and coordination of macroeconomic policies in the region? Studies such as 
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008 and 2010) illustrated the role of global banking system in 
transmitting monetary policy adjustments and adverse balance shocks across borders. In 
their 2008 study, Cetorelli and Goldberg demonstrate that the globalization of banking in the 
United States is influencing the monetary transmission mechanism both domestically and 
externally. Using quarterly information from all U.S. banks filing call reports between 1980 
and 2005, they closely analyze the response of lending of the foreign offices of U.S. global 
banks to a change in domestic monetary policy and find evidence consistent with the 
existence of an international mechanism of transmission of monetary policy.  
Furthermore, global banks played a significant role in the shock transmission in the 
2007 to 2009 crisis to emerging market economies. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010) examine 
the relationships between adverse liquidity shocks on main advanced-country banking 
systems to emerging markets across Europe, Asia, and Latin America, isolating loan supply 
from loan demand effects. Loan supply in emerging markets was significantly affected 
through three separate channels: a contraction in cross-border lending by foreign banks; a 
contraction in local lending by foreign banks’ affiliates in emerging markets; and a 
contraction in loan supply by domestic banks resulting from the funding shock to their 
balance sheet induced by the decline in interbank and cross-border lending.  
Based on these findings, it is therefore reasonable to argue that as global and 
regional integration of the banking system in East and Southeast Asia further deepens we 
could expect a greater transmission of policy and adverse shocks across these economies. 
Accordingly, these countries should naturally engage in closer cooperation in the monetary 
and exchange rate policies in particular. These issues will be elaborated further at the later 
part of the study. 
 
3. CMIM and AMRO: Brief History and Recent Commitments 
3.1 Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization  
In August 1997, at the initial outbreak of the East Asian financial crisis, Japan, 
together with several ASEAN economies, put forward the idea of the Asian Monetary Fund 
(AMF) with one of the primary objectives to provide financial support for Thailand. The initial 
target was to raise around US$50-60 billion from six ASEAN economies, Korea, China, 
Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei, and another US$50 billion from Japanix. The AMF was 
designed to enable these economies to carry out their own surveillance and some other 
 
 
11 
 
works of the IMF independently for its stakeholders. The proposal however never got off the 
ground due to strong opposition from the United States and the International Monetary 
Fund.x 
A similar idea, but this time given recognition of the IMF’s central role in the 
international monetary system, was discussed and proposed when ministers of finance and 
central bank deputies of fourteen Asia-Pacific economies met on 18-19 November 1997 in 
Manila. The so-called Manila framework included regional surveillance and financing 
arrangement. The initiative for regional surveillance was deliberated further during the 
ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting on 28 February 1998 in Jakarta and it was agreed that 
the ASEAN Surveillance mechanism should be established within the general framework of 
the IMF and with the assistance of the Asian Development Bank (ADB).  
The ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) became operational in early March 1999, 
coordinated by a small unit called the ASEAN Surveillance Coordinating Unit (ASCU) set up 
at the ASEAN Secretariat as well as in the ten ASEAN economies. The main tasks given to 
the ASP is: - to assess the most recent developments in global economies, as well as in the 
ten ASEAN economies’ economic and financial development, -to identify any increasing risk 
and vulnerability; and - to raise relevant policy issues for consideration of the ASEAN finance 
ministers. 
During the same period, regional cooperation of the ASEAN economies also 
expanded to include neighbouring countries in Northeast Asia, particularly China, Japan and 
Korea. The widened forum has been officially named “ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3)”, and 
the first ASEAN+3 Finance and Central Bank Deputies Meeting was held in Hanoi in March 
1999. The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was launched at a meeting of ASEAN+3 finance 
ministers in Thailand in May 2000. This initiative has a broad set of objectives for financial 
cooperation, involving policy dialogue, monitoring of capital flows, and reform of international 
financial institutions. However, series of bilateral swaps under CMI were found to be 
cumbersome and ineffective and it was therefore necessary to transform from bilateral to 
multilateral approach. In May 2009, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) was 
announced. Under the CMIM, the members of ASEAN+3 agreed to a self-managed reserve 
pooling arrangement governed by a single contractual agreement. The reserve would be 
held by national central banks. The disposition of those reserves however would be 
subjected to a single agreement. 
In its initial stage, the total size of the reserve pooling under the CMIM was about 
US$120 billion, a significant rise from $90 billion under the CMI arrangement. During the 
ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ Meeting (AFMGM+3) in May 
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2012 in Manila, officials agreed to double the size of the reserve pooling to USD240 billion. 
Table 5 provides details of the CMIM contributions, purchasing multiples and swap facilities. 
Each of the five major ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore) 
economies for instance contributes around US$9.1 billion and can draw around US$22.76 
billion of swap facility support. From the CMIM framework, each country stands to receive a 
higher amount swap facility than its contribution, with the exception of China and Japan.  
 
Table 5: CMIM Contribution, Purchasing Multiplier and Swap Facility 
Countries  
 
Financial  
Contribution 
(billion USD) 
Share(%) Purchasing Multiple 
Maximum  
Swap  
Amount 
(billion USD) 
Plus Three 192.00 80.00  117.30 
 
Japan 76.80 32.00 0.5 38.40 
China 
China   
76.80 
68.40 
32.00
28.50 0.5 34.20 
Hong Kong  
China 8.40 3.50 2.5 6.30 
Korea  38.40 16.00 1 38.40 
ASEAN  
 
48.00 20.00  126.20 
 Indonesia 9.104 3.793 2.5 22.76 
 Thailand 9.104 3.793 2.5 22.76 
 Malaysia 9.104 3.793 2.5 22.76 
 Singapore 9.104 3.793 2.5 22.76 
 Philippines 9.104 3.793 2.5 22.76 
 Vietnam 2.00 0.833 5 10.00 
 Cambodia 0.24 0.100 5 1.20 
 Myanmar 0.12 0.050 5 0.60 
 Brunei 0.06 0.025 5 0.30 
 Lad PDR 0.06 0.025 5 0.30 
 Total 240.00 100.00  243.50 
 
 
Source: AMRO website 
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3.2 AMRO: ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office 
The ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), officially established in 
January 2011, is another step forward in the formalization of concrete commitment to policy 
cooperation among ASEAN economies and three major Asian economies (China, Japan and 
Korea).xi The establishment of AMRO is aimed to elevate surveillance capacity of the region 
to a new level. This regional research office is tasked to three major responsibilities. First is 
to monitor, assess and prepare quarterly reports on the macroeconomic situation and 
financial soundness of the ASEAN+3 economies. Second set of tasks is to assess both 
macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities of the member economies, and provide 
assistance in timely formulation of policy recommendation to mitigate such risks. The lastly is 
to ensure compliance of swap requesting parties with lending covenants under the CMIM 
Agreement.   
The primary strength of the ASEAN surveillance is expected to come from its 
regional approach to be carried out by a regionally based team of economists. The greater 
focus on the features and characteristics of the member countries’ economies is the strength 
of regional surveillance framework. Having a team of regional experts to keep close and 
constant monitoring of the member economies is another comparative advantage that 
AMRO has to supplement the global surveillance institutions.    
 
3.3 Economic Review and Policy Dialogue 
In May 2002, the ASEAN+3 finance ministers introduced the ASEAN+3 Economic 
Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD) process to apply to a larger set of East Asian countries. 
The purposes of the ERPD process include (i) assessing global, regional, and national 
economic conditions; (ii) monitoring regional capital flows and currency markets; and (iii) 
analysing macroeconomic and financial risks. With the establishment of CMIM, full 
participation in the ERPD, including the surveillance activities of AMRO, has since become a 
pre-requisite for any member to have access to the multilateral reserve pooling.xii   
Since 2012, the central bank governors have been joining their respective finance 
ministers in the annual high level meeting, in addition to the deputy governors who has been 
representing the central banks/monetary authorities in the past. The participations of the 
Governors have enhanced further the quality of the peer-review process, as it has allowed 
for a more fruitful discussion over a wide range of economic and financial issues. In addition, 
the full participation of the central banks/monetary authorities at the highest levels is 
expected to further boost capacity of AMRO to carry out surveillance on one very key 
aspect, the financial stability. Given the highly globalized financial sectors of the ASEAN+3 
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economies and the macroeconomic-financial linkages, a comprehensive surveillance on the 
financial sector is imperative for the effectiveness of the regional surveillance. 
As mandated by the Chiang Mai Executive Committee (consisting of Vice Ministers of 
Finance and Deputy Governors of the Central Banks), AMRO’s economic surveillance 
reports are to be distributed only to the officials of Ministry of Finance and the Central Banks 
for the purpose of peer-reviews during the ERPD and not for public dissemination. The 
spirit/framework of peer-reviews has two primary advantages over public disclosure such as 
the cases of the IMF’s Article IV reports. First and foremost, it facilitates more open and 
frank discussions among the AMRO’s team of economists and the officials and other 
dialogue partners at the individual economies of the ASEAN+3. Second advantage is that 
the non-disclosure requirement has not only enabled the timely dissemination of the AMRO 
surveillance reports, but also more a more independent process. AMRO is only required to 
submit the report to the officials of the ASEAN+3 only 1-2 weeks before the high official 
meetings. More importantly, while the officials can rebuke the points/analyses provided in 
the report, those points are supposed to be aired or distributed as written responses during 
the ERPD. Hence, AMRO’s reports are not exposed to long delays of revisions to 
accommodate official views, with the exception of factual mistakes. The features and traits of 
the ERPD process are fundamental in promoting frank policy discussions among key 
officials of the ASEAN+3 economies, which would be vital base for any workable 
macroeconomic policy cooperation among them. Next section tables a number of these 
feasible policy corporations.    
 
4. Regional Policy Coordination: Possible Roles and Challenges Facing CMIM 
As briefly mentioned in the Introduction section of the paper, this part of the study will 
propose a list of key policy areas for cooperation and presents basic premises and promises 
of the CMIM and AMRO in enhancing further policy coordination among the member 
economies. The discussion will then move on to the set of potential obstacles to fully realize 
the potential of this regional financial cooperation. 
 
4.1 Regional Exchange Rate Policy Cooperation  
A market-driven process, in much the same way that the process of intra-regional 
trade and investment has evolved in the region in the past decades, is the likely course that 
any form of regional exchange rate cooperation will advance in the ASEAN+3 region, which 
could potentially arrive at a formalization of regional monetary and exchange rate 
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cooperation in 2030. In other words, the process of Asian monetary integration could be 
better characterized as being ‘evolutionary’ rather than the European ‘revolutionary’ process 
of monetary unification. Furthermore, the emphasis is more on policy cooperation driven by 
closer market integration of ASEAN, not on a more rigid form such as policy coordination 
adopted by the euro-zone economies. 
Before deliberating on possible options for exchange rate cooperation in the region, 
few concrete lessons from the European Union experiences, especially during the recent 
global financial crisis, should be reflected on. First and foremost is the need to recognize and 
appreciate the diversities and the heterogeneities of the ASEAN economies and the political 
realities and sensitivities of each government in the region. A particular importance should 
also be placed on the issues and challenges facing the CLMV countries as they represent 
the less developed parts of any potential exchange rate policy cooperation in the region. 
Second, any regional rigid exchange rate policy arrangement could potentially expose the 
policy makers of the ASEAN economies to all important exchange rate policy options to 
absorb the impacts of the crisis, originated either domestically or externally. This is one of 
the common lessons from past and recent regional and global economic and financial crises.    
With the backgrounds above, the ultimate objective of exchange rate policy 
cooperation in East and Southeast Asian region should be to attain stable intra-regional 
exchange rate while allowing for inter-regional exchange rate flexibility. What are the options 
for regional exchange rate policy cooperation for the region? Suggestions from recent 
studies are worth considering, especially from those of Wyplosz and Adams (2010). To 
maintain some degree of flexibility, exchange rate cooperation for ASEAN+3 economies can 
in fact be considered in stages. The first stage, in which ASEAN has already embarked on 
for almost a decade now, is a relatively informal arrangement. As discussed, the ASEAN+3 
(ASEAN, China, Japan and Korea) regional economic review and policy dialogue (EPRD) 
was established in May 2000. The short-run strategy is therefore to fully utilize the EPRD to 
facilitate a more formal agreement among the economies to maintain regional exchange rate 
stability against corresponding weights representing each country’s specific trade structures.  
Under a rising degree of trade and financial integration among the ASEAN 
economies (or ASEAN+3 economies), one would expect that the region’s economies are in 
effect gradually adopting a relatively similar basket of regional currencies. This is the second 
stage of this exchange rate policy cooperation of which a similar set of baskets of trading 
partner currencies with a relatively similar weight distribution should naturally surface driven 
especially by increasing trade and financial integration among the ASEAN economies in 
particular and the East Asian economies in general. Accordingly, one would expect that 
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movements of ASEAN currencies against each other should stabilize during this second 
stage.   
 
4.2 Managing Price Stability to Induce Stable Exchange Rate Stability 
Another encouraging development is with the convergence in the overall monetary 
policy mandate of the ASEAN economies.  In particular, price stability, together with financial 
stability, has become the most common and primary mandate of the monetary authorities 
around the region. Furthermore, under the CMIM initiative of the ASEAN+3, maintaining 
price and financial stability plays a vital role within the overall pursuance of balance of 
payment stability by the member economies. Credible price stability policy, either via explicit 
or implicit inflation targeting framework, would anchor and stabilize inflationary expectation 
and in turn help to keep foreign exchange market stable. In short, the commitment to price 
stability should indirectly or directly require commitment to exchange rate stability in the 
region. Eichengreen (2009) for instance argues for the adoption of harmonized inflation 
targeting (IT) policy in the region. He argues that under the IT policy framework, exchange 
rate policy takes a subsidiary role to the commitment of inflation target. With appropriate 
agreed rate of inflation target, exchange rate volatility should be limited or anchored when a 
harmonized IT policy regime is adopted. Four ASEAN+3 economies, Indonesia, Korea, 
Philippines and Thailand have adopted IT policy. However, having an explicit and 
harmonized IT regime may arguably be not necessary. Many countries in ASEAN+3, such 
as Malaysia and Singapore for instance, have well established reputation as low inflation 
economies without necessarily adopting a full-blown IT regime. It is sufficient that the 
ASEAN+3 economies together agree to a credible inflation target. This target could be a 
range (not necessarily a point target) and over a period of more than one year to provide 
some flexibility.  
Here again, peer-pressure through the regular surveillance of AMRO and high level 
official meeting and EPRD dialogue of the CMIM should guard against inflationary policy 
adopted by any one of the member economies, except during recessionary or crisis period 
where loose macroeconomic policy stance maybe needed. To guard and optimize the 
outcome of the policy cooperation, the EPRD should encourage and facilitate frank policy 
discussion and cooperation to place more weights on the importance of regional objectives, 
rather than national one, on the exchange rate policies. The attainment of this policy 
cooperation should reduce tension that might arise due to policy of competition of non-
appreciation (Wyplosz and Adams (2010)). The full participation of central bank governors in 
the high-level Ministerial meeting of the ASEAN+3 economies starting in 2012 should further 
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elevate regular dialogues on exchange rate policy, including pertaining policy cooperation 
among the relevant authorities.  
It is important to note as well here the rising influence of Chinese renminbi in the 
currency baskets in ASEAN. China has become the central hub of production networks in 
Asia, particularly in East Asia, and an important trading partner of many economies in 
ASEAN+3. It is only natural, therefore, that the Chinese renminbi’s influence on the 
currencies of ASEAN+3 should continue to rise in the coming decades. In fact, an increasing 
number of studies have demonstrated the escalating influences of Chinese renmimbi on the 
Asian currencies in general.  Colavecchio and Funke (2007) for instance investigated the 
spill-over effects from the renminbi to Asian currencies in the onshore and offshore forward 
markets.  Similarly, Ho et al. (2005) noted that the renminbi non-deliverable forward rates 
had some bearing on the spot rates of the Asian currencies during the period of rising 
speculation on renminbi appreciation in 2003- 2004. Applying the Frankel and Wei (1994) 
framework, Shu, Chow and Chan (2007) claimed that since July 2005, the fluctuations of the 
renminbi that were independent of those of the US dollar tended to lead to movements in the 
same direction in other Asian currencies. In accord with Shu, Chow and Chan (2007), 
Pontines and Siregar (2012) also found evidences of heightened fear of appreciation among 
a number of major ASEAN currencies against the renminbi rather than against the US dollar. 
In short, one could envision the central role of the Chinese renmimbi in further enhancing 
and expediting natural convergence of exchange rate regimes based on similar baskets of 
currencies in ASEAN+3 economies.   
 
4.3 Fiscal Sustainability 
The recent experience of the monetary union in Europe in dealing with the global 
financial crisis is absolutely instructive for ASEAN economies, especially as the lessons of 
the importance of prudent and sustainable fiscal management. Years of undisciplined budget 
planning in many parts of the euro-zone lead into mounting cost of stock of public debt and 
public debt to GDP ratio.  As long as the economy continues to expand and inflation is under 
control, the level of debt remains sustainable. However, as witnessed during the recent 2008 
global financial crisis, risk of financing cost to rise heightened with sudden downturn of the 
market sentiment.  
The Euro-zone experiences during the sub-prime crisis also taught us that fiscal 
policy coordination requires much more than commitments between governments of the 
relevant economies. Approvals from the parliaments are typically required for any decisions 
related to budget and fiscal policy in general, making it very difficult to have government-to-
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government commitments on fiscal coordination or cooperation.xiii Learning from the recent 
euro-zone experiences, adopting rigid fiscal policy coordination should therefore not be an 
option for the ASEAN-2030. However, close monitoring and policy surveillance on fiscal 
discipline can be carried out via the quarterly surveillance works of the AMRO and regular 
high-level ERPD meetings both at the level of Vice Minister of Finance and Deputy Governor 
meeting and the meeting of Minister of Finance and Central Bank Governor of the ASEAN+3 
economies.  
Given the importance of fiscal sustainability in the overall balance of payment, price 
and financial stabilities, an official commitment between the ASEAN+3 governments to 
conduct frequent assessment of debt sustainability at least once a year during normal time 
and more frequently in the event of financial and economic turbulence is to be carried out 
jointly by the authorities and AMRO, with possible supports from global multilateral 
surveillance institutions, should be pursued. For this surveillance to be meaningful and 
effective, a comprehensive analysis on the soundness and sustainability of individual 
members’ budgetary and fiscal positions should be regularly conducted.  
The outcome of the fiscal sustainability analyses should then be tabled and 
discussed during ERPD and other high level meetings of CMIM officials, such as the annual 
meeting of ASEAN+3 finance ministers and central bank governors.  As in the case of 
balance of payment issue, exchange rate and monetary policy concern and financial market 
fragility, thorough discussions on budget/fiscal policy have increasingly become a 
predominant feature of quarterly surveillance report of the AMRO.  
 
4.4 Cross-border Cooperation in Banking Supervision 
With the financial systems becoming increasingly integrated globally, a robust 
ASEAN framework of financial stability is required. It is now a well-known fact that globalized 
banks play a crucial role in the international transmission of monetary policies and economic 
shocks. xiv  The lack of cross-border supervision cooperation has led to information 
asymmetries on cross-border risks leading to an under-appreciation by supervisors and 
regulators of the underlying systemic risks and interconnections (Kodres and Narain (2009)). 
It is also clear that asymmetric information which prevails among supervisors and regulators 
in different jurisdictions leads to premature and uncoordinated responses to financial crisis 
(Nijathaworn (2010)). In addition, in normal times, cross-country supervisory cooperation and 
coordination are needed to overcome loopholes, such as currency exchange, or 
replacement of domestic credit to foreign direct credit in foreign currency.  
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Thus, one obvious route towards an ASEAN+3 framework of financial stability is to 
develop effective regional supervision of cross-border banks through policy cooperation and 
coordination among ASEAN+3 supervisors; an early existence of that is the college of 
supervisors. The college of supervisors is defined as a “permanent, although flexible, 
structure for cooperation and coordination among the authorities of different jurisdictions 
responsible for and involved in the supervision of the different components of cross-border 
banking groups, specifically large groups” (The Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS (2009)). As a general rule, the establishment of a supervisory college should be 
considered for significant financial institutions in terms of size, interconnectedness with other 
components of the financial system and/or the roles they play in the market which may 
cause systemic impacts on the economy’s financial system, hence affecting the region’s 
financial stability. 
The successful implementation of the college of supervisors depends mostly on the 
willingness to exchange information of all stakeholders. The idea of sharing information 
across border arises from the recognition that even when financial stability is achieved at the 
national level, it does not guarantee stability of the regional/international financial systems. 
However, exchange and dissemination of vital information on financial institutions are often 
difficult for supervisors due to the difference of jurisdictions, rules and constitutional limits. 
Moreover, conflicting surveillance assessments should be anticipated owing to the enormous 
diversities of operational structures among the banking sector in different economies. Given 
the sensitivity of the information that is required for sharing and dissemination (such as 
stress tests results and risk assessments on the cross-border institutions (Saccomanni 
(2009)), supervisors may need to weigh and balance the issues pertaining to national 
interests. In some circumstances, when problems are beginning to surface, there may be a 
divergence of interests where the home or host supervisors seek to ring-fence problems at 
the national level and hence, impede the early detection of emerging group-wide cross 
border problems. Particularly during a crisis, in defending national interests, national 
supervisors may not be willing to disclose information on vulnerabilities of financial 
institutions they supervise (de Larosiere Group (2009)).  
As a surveillance unit of the ASEAN+3, AMRO has regularly highlighted potential 
risks faced by the banking sector of the region. The role and impact of foreign banks’ claims 
to the regional economies have been closely monitored and placed predominantly in the 
quarterly surveillance reports of AMRO. During the bi-annual meetings of Vice Ministers of 
Finance and Deputy Governors of Central Banks, issues and concerns arising from the 
international bank claims have been tabled among potential sources of vulnerabilities 
undermining macroeconomic and financial stability of the region. Past reports for instance 
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highlighted the relatively high and volatile shares of cross-border lending by the foreign 
banks, including the Eurozone banks, to the ASEAN+3 economies. The surveillance reports 
have also provided further analyses on the impacts of these loans on the domestic 
economies, particularly on the liquidity of the domestic banking sector and the asset 
markets, such as stock exchange and real estate sector. In mid-2012, AMRO has also 
submitted in-house thematic study on the interconnectedness of the banking sectors of the 
ASEAN+3 economies. The study pointed out the regional and global networks of ASEAN+3 
banks and the increasing role that they play in financing intra-regional trade and investment. 
Accordingly, the study stressed the need to enhance supervisory capacities in the region, 
including cross-border cooperation among the supervisors.     
 
5. Enforcing Multilateral Approach amidst Presence of Bilateral Arrangements 
Over the past few years, numerous bilateral swap arrangements have been 
established among the ASEAN+3 economies (Table 6). The PRC and Japan, for instance, 
have extended swap facilities to Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Korea over the years to 
mitigate potential liquidity concerns facing recipient economies, and also to safeguard and 
promote bilateral trade activities. It is also interesting to note that in some cases the size of 
the bilateral swap facilities is well above the maximum swap facility extended by the CMIM. 
Malaysia, for instance, secured a RMB180 billion (or about $30 billion) bilateral swap 
arrangement with the People’s Bank of China in February 2012 for a period of three years 
(until February 2015). This swap facility is indeed larger than the $22.76 billion maximum 
swap facility that Malaysia is entitled to from the CMIM facility.  
With the multilateralization of the Chiang Mai initiative, the current challenge is not 
only to avoid potential conflicts between these two approaches, but also to find ways to 
create synergy between these two types of facilities. Without concrete coordination there is a 
real risk that the CMIM is undermined by the bilateral facilities. After all, what would be the 
incentive for any ASEAN+3 economies to apply for the CMIM facility, especially given the 
size limitation? How can a multilateral swap facility like the CMIM become an attractive 
facility given a choice of bilateral swap facilities and IMF funding facilities, without leading to 
moral hazard, while preventing “facility shopping”? Non-credible multilateral approach 
undermines the commitment to policy cooperation discussed earlier. 
Bilateral and CMIM swap arrangements can indeed complement each other if they 
are well coordinated. More importantly, decisions to extend both bilateral and CMIM swap 
facilities should be taken consistently and, as much as possible, under one general 
framework. In particular, a common framework for bilateral and CMIM swap facilities among 
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the ASEAN+3 economies can be agreed upon in a joint memorandum of understanding. As 
part of broad guidelines, any request from a member of the ASEAN+3 economies for a 
bilateral swap facility from another member of the ASEAN+3 should first be submitted to the 
CMIM facility for consideration. In other words, the request should go through an evaluation 
and decision process under the CMIM framework. Should the request be approved by the 
CMIM’s Executive Committee, the requesting member economy would then be entitled to 
receive its available maximum swap amount. In the event that the available CMIM swap 
amount is less than the amount requested or needed, the bilateral swap can supplement or 
top-up the difference. 
The other synergy of bilateral frameworks and the CMIM is found in the surveillance. 
Liquidity provision would never be without risks in both cases, especially that for economies 
in crises. On the other hand, foreign reserves are assets of the countries, ultimately of the 
citizens of the countries. The authorities should, therefore, be accountable in crediting the 
counterpart with exposing the foreign reserves to risks. Multinational surveillance, as AMRO 
conducts, can be an effective tools even in case of bilateral arrangements for authorities to 
satisfy accountabilities; it is not only effective but also less costly than conducting 
surveillance bilaterally. In that regard, multilateral frameworks such as the CMIM would be a 
core foundation of bilateral arrangements.   
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Table 6: Recent Bilateral Swap Involving ASEAN+3 Economies 
Signing 
date/Expiry date 
Countries Type of 
Swap 
 Amount 
May 2 2012/ 
May 3, 2015 
Bangko 
Sentral ng 
Pilipinas 
(BSP) and 
Bank of 
Japan (BOJ) 
Bilateral 
Swap 
Arrangement 
(BSA) 
Under the $6.5 billion BSA, the 
BOJ would provide the BSP up to 
$6 billion in financial assistance in 
exchange for a corresponding 
amount of Philippine currency in 
case Manila's foreign exchange 
reserves drop to a level that risks 
a run on the peso. As a two-way 
swap arrangement, the BSP also 
would provide the BOJ up to 
$500 million in assistance in 
exchange for a corresponding 
amount of Japanese yen if Tokyo 
similarly were faced with balance 
of payments (BOP) difficulties. 
 
$6.5 bn: 
BOJBSP 
0.5 bn 
BSPBOJ. 
October 19, 
2011/ effective 
until the end of 
October 2012 
Bank of 
Japan and 
the Bank of 
Korea 
Yen-Won 
Swap 
Arrangement 
Non-crisis situation, to stabilizing 
regional financial markets through 
supplying short-term liquidity. 
30 billion US 
dollars 
equivalent in 
Yen. 
BOK jointly 
with Ministry 
of Strategy 
and Finance 
and Japan's 
finance 
ministry 
Won-USD 
Swap 
Arrangement 
Mutual benefits and financial 
stability to enhance the country's 
sovereign credit condition. 
40 billion 
dollars (from 
10 billion 
dollars). 
June 22, 2010/ 
July 3, 2013 
 
Bank of 
Japan and 
the Bank of 
Korea 
Yen-Won 
Swap 
Arrangement 
Bilateral yen-won swap 
arrangement, for supplying short-
term liquidity and enhance mutual 
cooperation between the two 
central banks. 
3 billion US 
dollars 
equivalent in 
yen and won. 
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Table 6: (continued) 
Signing 
date/Expiry date 
Countries Type of Swap  Amount 
March 22, 2012/ 
March 21, 2015  
 
People’s 
Bank of 
China and 
the Reserve 
Bank of 
Australia 
Bilateral 
Local 
Currency 
Swap 
For the purpose of promoting 
bilateral financial cooperation, 
facilitating bilateral trade and 
investment, and safeguarding 
regional financial stability 
200 billion 
yuan or A$30 
billion. 
March 20, 2012/  
March 19, 2015  
 
People’s 
Bank of 
China and 
Bank of 
Mongolia 
Bilateral 
Local 
Currency 
Swap 
Supplemental 
Agreement 
The two sides believe that this 
renewed arrangement will help 
facilitate bilateral investment 
and trade and safeguard 
regional financial stability. 
 
Increased 
from original 5 
billion yuan or 
1 trillion MNT 
to 10 billion 
yuan or 2 
trillion MNT. 
February 21, 
2012/ February 
20, 2015 
 
People’s 
Bank of 
China and 
the Central 
Bank of the 
Republic of 
Turkey 
Bilateral 
Local 
Currency 
Swap  
For the purpose of promoting 
bilateral financial cooperation, 
facilitating bilateral trade and 
investment, and maintaining 
regional financial stability. 
10 billion yuan 
or 3 billion 
Turkish lira. 
8 February 2012/ 
7 February 2015  
 
People's 
Bank of 
China and 
Central Bank 
of Malaysia 
Bilateral 
Local 
Currency 
Swap  
The two sides believe that this 
renewed arrangement will help 
promote investment and trade 
between the two countries and 
safeguard regional financial 
stability. 
 
Increased 
size from 80 
billion 
yuan/MYR40 
billion to 180 
billion 
yuan/MYR90 
billion. 
January 17, 
2012/ 
January 16, 2015 
 
People’s 
Bank of 
China and 
Central Bank 
of the UAE 
Bilateral 
Local 
Currency 
Swap  
For the purpose of promoting 
bilateral financial cooperation, 
facilitating bilateral trade and 
investment, and maintaining 
regional financial stability 
The amount 
of the 
agreement is 
35 billion yuan 
or 20 billion 
dirham. 
December 22, 
2011/ December 
21, 2014 
 
People’s 
Bank of 
China and 
the Bank of 
Thailand 
Bilateral 
Local 
Currency 
Swap  
For the purpose of promoting 
bilateral financial cooperation, 
facilitating bilateral trade and 
investment, and maintaining 
regional financial stability 
The amount 
of the 
agreement is 
70 billion yuan 
or 320 billion 
Thai Baht. 
December 23, 
2011/ 
People’s 
Bank of 
China and 
Bilateral 
Local 
Currency 
For the purpose of promoting 
bilateral financial cooperation, 
facilitating bilateral trade and 
The amount 
of the 
agreement is 
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Both parties—the recipient and the lender—can benefit from this proposal. The 
eligible recipient economy is in position to receive a swap amount larger than its maximum 
swap amount under the CMIM; the swap provider can take comfort in the due process of 
surveillance and approval under the CMIM facility, before having to extend the fund. Without 
this arrangement, the swap providing economy would have to rely on its own surveillance 
process, before the swap takes place and afterwards, to decide on the request. Furthermore, 
the swap-providing economy must bear the whole amount of the swap requested under the 
non-cooperative framework. However, under a single contract of multilateral swap facility, 
the swap provider does not have to shoulder the risk of the full amount, as some of the funds 
fall under the multilateral facility.  
 
6. Brief Concluding Remarks 
Prudent and coherent macroeconomic policies are mandatory, not only to provide 
much-needed conducive climate for growth but also to steer the economy away from 
economic crisis or turbulent domestically or externally originated. In a globally integrated 
region, the consequences and trade-offs of domestic policies may not only be endured 
locally, but also could easily be transmitted abroad. Avoiding potentially derailing economic 
and financial crises, such as experienced in 1997 East-Asian and 2008 sub-prime financial 
meltdowns, is indeed imperative.  
December 22, 
2014 
 
the State 
Bank of 
Pakistan 
Swap  investment, and maintaining 
regional financial stability. 
10 billion yuan 
or 140 billion 
Pakistan 
Rupee. 
October 26, 
2011/ 
October 25, 2014 
 
People’s 
Bank of 
China and 
Bank of 
Korea 
Bilateral 
Local 
Currency 
Swap  
The two central banks have also 
agreed to explore the possibility 
of converting some swap 
currencies into reserve 
currencies. 
The two sides believe that this 
renewed arrangement will help 
enhance bilateral financial 
cooperation, promote 
investment and trade between 
the two countries, and 
safeguard regional financial 
stability. 
 
Increase in 
size from 180 
billion yuan/38 
trillion won to 
360 billion 
yuan/64 
trillion won. 
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The primary objective of our study is to list potentially catalytic roles that CMIM, a 
regional financial arrangement among ASEAN+3 economies and its surveillance unit 
(AMRO) can play in enhancing macroeconomic policy cooperation in this region. Amidst the 
increasingly connected ASEAN+3 economies regionally and globally, these regional 
financial arrangements will not only be a first layer of defence mechanism, supplementing 
the global facility such as those provided by the International Monetary Fund, to deal with 
economic and financial shocks, but more importantly, they can be a natural base to foster 
the much-needed macroeconomic policy cooperation among these East and Southeast 
Asian economies. 
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Appendix: 
Table Appendix 1: Days Required for Trade Procedure. 
 
Time to import (days) 
Year  Brunei Darussalam  Cambodia  Indonesia 
Lao 
PDR  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand  Vietnam  China 
Hong Kong 
SAR, China  Japan 
Korea, 
Rep. 
2006  ‐  54  27  65  10  18  4  22  23  26  17  11  12 
2007  19  45  27  65  10  18  4  22  23  24  5  11  12 
2008  19  45  27  37  10  18  4  14  23  24  5  11  10 
2009  19  29  27  37  10  16  4  13  23  24  5  11  8 
2010  19  29  27  37  10  16  4  13  21  24  5  11  8 
2011  20  26  27  37  10  14  4  13  21  24  5  11  7 
2012  15  26  27  33  10  14  4  13  21  24  5  11  7 
2013  15  26  23  26  8  14  4  13  21  24  5  11  7 
Time to export/import (days) 
Year  Brunei Darussalam  Cambodia  Indonesia 
Lao 
PDR  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand  Vietnam  China 
Hong Kong 
SAR, China  Japan 
Korea, 
Rep. 
2006  ‐  48.5  24.5  60  11.5  17.5  4.5  23  23.5  24.5  15  10.5  12 
2007  23  41  24.5  60  11.5  17.5  4.5  23  23.5  22.5  5.5  10.5  12 
2008  23  41  22.5  38  11.5  17.5  4.5  15.5  23.5  22.5  5.5  10.5  10.5 
2009  23  25.5  22.5  38  11.5  16  4.5  13.5  23.5  22.5  5.5  10.5  8 
2010  23  25.5  22.5  38  11.5  16  4.5  13.5  21.5  22.5  5.5  10.5  8 
2011  22.5  24  22  37  11.5  14.5  4.5  13.5  21.5  22.5  5.5  10.5  7.5 
2012  17  24  22  33  11.5  14.5  4.5  13.5  21.5  22.5  5  10.5  7 
2013  17  24  20  26  9.5  14.5  4.5  13.5  21  22.5  5  10.5  7 
Source: the International Finance Corporation, Doing Business Database 
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End Notes: 
                                                            
i The ASEAN+3 includes ten Southeast Asian (ASEAN) economies (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam) and three East Asian 
partners (the Plus-3 (China, Japan and Korea)). 
 
ii Australia and New Zealand are under one FTA with ASEAN, and each of other countries has FTAs 
with ASEAN. Those 16 countries are called ASEAN+6 as a group. 
 
iii It was originally known as Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPSEP). 
 
iv Some of other Asian countries show their interests in TPP, including China, whose spokesman 
mentioned in June 2013, ahead of the China-US summit, that they were considering the benefits and 
possibility of participation in TPP.   
 
v  IFC’s “Doing Business, Trading Across Borders” database measures the procedural costs for 
exports and imports with standardsized figures. It counts any procedure during the period between 
the contractual agreement of trades and the delivery of goods. 
 
vi ASEAN-6 includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
 
vii Survey of Overseas Business Activities by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) of 
Japan captures data of foreign affiliates in which Japanese corporations invest 10% or more of the 
capitals; in which subsidiaries ,which are funded more than 50% by Japanese corporations, invest 
more than 50% of the capitals; or in which Japanese corporations and subsidiaries invest more than 
50% of capitals. The survey FY2011 obtained 4,258 effective answers out of 6,127 target firms. 
(METI, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/statistics/tyo/kaigaizi/index.html).  
 
viii The South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research and Training Centre commenced in 
1973. There are currently 19 member central banks and monetary authorities from Pacific economies 
to East and South Asia. In addition to ASEAN-10 economies, the members include central banks from 
South Asia (Sri Lanka, Nepal and India), East Asia (Korea, Chinese Taipei and People’s Republic of 
China), Mongolia, Fiji and Papua New Guinea.  
 
ix  Six ASEAN economies here include Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and 
Singapore. 
 
x Refer to Manupipatpong (2002) for more insight to background perspectives of surveillance process 
in ASEAN. 
 
xi The initiative of establishing an independent regional surveillance unit was first tabled during the 
Economic Review and Policy Dialogue of the ASEAN+3 economies in Turkey in 2005. 
 
xii This is clearly stipulated in Article 10.1.2 of The CMIM Agreement. 
 
xiii In September 2011, approvals of 17 euro-zone parliaments were needed to introduce a greater 
flexibility in the utilization of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) to support the banking 
sector and the sovereign debts. 
 
xiv The importance of supervisory cooperation is again coming to the forefront following the recent 
subprime crisis.  This time around, the issue is on cross-border supervision --why it has not 
progressed to what it should be, to deal with the scope and complexity of financial development (BIS 
(2009). 
 
